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A Different Challenge for the ALI: Herein





While the debate goes on about a new restatement of conflict of laws-and indeed
about the restatement movement generally'-we want to take the opportunity to
describe a somewhat different kind of project recently undertaken by the American
Law Institute ("ALI") in which we will function as co-Reporters. We do not pretend
that our project will take the place ofrestatements; we do believe that our project will
interest anyone who is fascinated with conflict of laws, federalism, and the
intersection of private and public international law.
I. THE PROJECT
Our project concerns the preparation of a draft (or possibly two drafts) of a federal
statute concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments.'
The impetus for this project was not a sudden realization that federal law concerning
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments would be an attractive
idea. The catalyst was the current negotiation at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law looking to the conclusion of a worldwide convention on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments.' If a
convention is concluded that is attractive to the United States, federal legislation
would presumably be desirable to assure its implementation as United States law, and
to sort out the inevitable problems of federalism that the Convention would pose. The
ALI, with the encouragement of the U.S. State Department, has undertaken to help
to shape such a statute. Even should the effort at The Hague fall short-which as of
t Copyright 2000 by Linda J. Silberman and Andreas F. Lowenfeld.
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1. See, e.g., Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship, and the
Restatements of Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573 (1998).
2. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, PROPOSAL FOR PROJECT ON
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENTION, Submitted for Discussion on May 20, 1999, at
the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute.
3. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationalizing International Law: Essay in Honor of
Louis Henkin, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121, 127-31 (1997).
4. The initiative for such a multilateral treaty at the Hague Conference was that of the
United States. See generally Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law To Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement
ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7 (1998); Arthur T. von
Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Judgments: A New Approachfor the Hague
Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 271 (1994).
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year-end 1999 is not at all out of the question-the project would continue, focused
on a proposal for a federal statute imposing uniform standards of recognition and
enforcement of foreign country judgments.
In directing its efforts to a proposed federal statute concerning foreign country
judgments, the ALI puts itself in a position to change an important aspect of the law
of recognition and enforcement. As we have found out in several contexts, it is
virtually impossible to explain to French or Dutch or Japanese lawyers that a
judgment originating in their country may be enforceable in New York but not in
New Jersey, in Oklahoma but not in Arkansas. That is, however, the case.
Recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments in the United States is
generally a matter of state law-regardless of whether enforcement is sought in state
or federal court.' And even though the adoption of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act6 by a significant number of states in recent years has
diminished the degree of disuniformity of American recognition practice,7 a number
of important substantive differences remain.
Several examples of such differences may be cited. The majority American rule,
consistent with the Uniform Act and the Restatement (Third) ofthe Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, rejects any requirement of reciprocity-that is, imposing
as a condition for enforcement (and perhaps for recognition) of the judgment of
Country X evidence that the courts of Country Xwould enforce the judgment of an
American court if the facts were reversed.' In several states of the United States,
however, reciprocity has been retained as either a mandatory or a discretionary
ground on which to refuse enforcement and recognition.9 Whatever the correct view
5. The rule is not absolute. For instance, if an issue of recognition of a foreign country
judgment is asserted as a defense to a federal claim, federal rather than state law may be used.
Likewise, claims in admiralty or under a federal statute or treaty would not rely on state law
of recognition, but would probably seek to discover or formulate some kind of federal rule. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt.
a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
6. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AcT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (Supp. 1998).
As of January 2000, the following jurisdictions had adopted the Uniform Act, some with minor
variations: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virgin Islands, Virginia, and Washington.
7. Many (but not all) states apply the general principles of the Uniform Act even though
they have not formally adopted the Act. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman,
United States ofAmerica, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (Charles
Platto & William G. Horton eds., 2d ed. 1993); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
5, §§ 481-482 & reporters' notes.
8. Actually, the classic statement of the reciprocity rule, in the famous case of Hilton v.
Guyot, is more limited, in that it explicitly denies enforcement only in the case where the
judgment rendered in the foreign state is in favor of a citizen of that state against a noncitizen
of that state. 159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895).
9. For discretionary application ofthe reciprocity requirement under the Uniform Act, see,
for example, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605(a) (West Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 10-1404 (1998);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.91 (West Baldwin 1998); TEx. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 36.004 (West 1997). See also Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d
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of the reciprocity issue, we believe that the standard should be uniform throughout
the nation. Adoption by the United States of a multilateral convention on judgments
and the accompanying implementing legislation would, of course, result in a national
standard applicable to judgments of countries that have also adopted the proposed
Hague Convention. Even in the absence ofa convention, orwith respectto judgments
of countries that do notjoin the convention, a federal statute could establish a uniform
national standard on whether or not to require reciprocity.
A second aspect of enforcement practice that lacks uniformity and creates
uncertainty relates to the jurisdictional grounds on which the foreign country
judgment is founded. Lack of jurisdiction in the rendering court is, of course, a
defense everywhere to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. But, at
least at the margin, the standards by which to assess a foreign court's jurisdiction are
far from clear. The Uniform Act lists a number of jurisdictional bases which are to
be accepted, including personal service in the forum state, voluntary appearance by
the defendant, prior agreement to the forum, domicile of an individual or principal
place of business of a corporation in the forum state, a claim arising out of a motor
vehicle or airplane accident in the forum state, and a claim arising out of business
done by defendant through a business office in that state." In addition, the Uniform
Act provides that courts may recognize other bases of jurisdiction. 2 Thus, even
among states of the United States that have adopted the Uniform Act, the
jurisdictional grounds on which a foreign judgment will be accepted may well
differ. 3 Again, a uniform federal standard for those jurisdictional grounds that will
be recognized for enforcement purposes would promote certainty and predictability.
1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas law and refusing to recognize an Abu Dhabi
judgment in favor of French bank on the ground that there was no assurance of reciprocity for
U.S. judgments). Massachusetts and Georgia appear to have a mandatory reciprocity
requirement under the Uniform Act. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A (Law. Co-op.
1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-132 (1993).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 482(l)(b); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AcT § 4, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986).
11. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGmENTS RECOGNITION ACT§ 5(a), 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986).
12. Id. § 5(b).
13. It is generally thought that a foreign judgment based on jurisdictional grounds
consistent with U.S. jurisdictional standards will be enforced. See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v.
Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (enforcing aCanadian judgment rendered against
a defendant who had breached a contract of guarantee with Canadian bank, where defendant
was engaged in business in British Columbia, was a director and shareholder of a company
operating there, and had signed a contract in British Columbia specifically related to dealings
there), af'd, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980). But cf Siedler v. Jacobson, 383 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834
(App. Div. 1976) (refusing to enforce a default judgment of an Austrian court against an
American defendant, where jurisdiction of the rendering court was based on defendant's
purchase of antique porcelain during a one-week visit to Vienna). The court held that although
New York's internal standard for jurisdiction was equally broad (claims arising from
transaction of business within the state), it was not the intention to extend recognition of
foreign country judgments to such "liberal" bases ofjurisdiction.
2000]
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Such a federal standard would probably emerge if a worldwide convention is
accepted; 4 even without the convention, a uniform federal standard ofjurisdiction
for enforcement and recognition could be adopted in a federal statute.
II. THE OUTLINES OF THE CONVENTION
Many but not all of the provisions of the proposed convention have been developed
atthis point;'5 in any event, they are sufficiently clear to foresee the needs and options
for implementing legislation.' 6 The Convention presently under discussion is to some
extent modeled on the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 7 in force among the members of the
European Community. Among notable differences, however, the proposed Hague
Convention would be open to a much wider number of States, and there would be no
final authority comparable to the European Court of Justice to oversee its operation.
The point of departure is that civil judgments rendered in one treaty State against
persons domiciled in another treaty State will be recognized in all other treaty States,
subject to a narrow list of defenses, provided the court that rendered thejudgment had
jurisdiction over the defendant according to an agreed standard. Unlike the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,'" the proposed Hague
Convention would make elaborate provision for jurisdiction of courts,'9 as well as for
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments.
The negotiations at The Hague are complex and must harmonize different sets of
conflicting interests. Because foreign judgments are recognized and enforced to a
much greater extent in the United States than judgments rendered in the United States
14. The proposed Hague Convention itself might create the basis for a federal common law
rule to be developed by the courts. See Harold G. Maier, A Hague Conference Judgments
Convention and United States Courts: A Problem and a Possibility, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1207,
1224-35 (1998). We believe it would be more desirable to specify such a standard in
implementing legislation.
15. The latest Convention Draft was adopted at the October session of the Special
Commission. The original plan to hold a final diplomatic conference in October 2000 may
need to be revised, in light of the many controversial issues that have arisen.
16. Two journals have published symposia on the proposed Hague Convention. See
Symposium, "Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doctrine? ", 61 ALB. L.
REv. 1159 (1998); Symposium, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
17. Sept. 27, 1968, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2 (consolidated) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
The Brussels Convention is in effect for the 12 states that were members of the European
Community (European Union) prior to January 1, 1995. A parallel Convention, the Lugano
Convention, adopts the principles of the Brussels Convention for the European Free Trade
Association countries but without opportunity for recourse to the European Court of Justice.
See 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9.
18. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § I.
19. The direct regulation of jurisdiction is one major difference between this proposed
Hague Convention and an earlier Hague Convention that proved to be unsuccessful. See Hague
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249 (having only a few signatories and no
practical effect). See generally von Mehren, supra note 4, at 271, 274-82.
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are recognized and enforced abroad,2" the interest of the United States is in gaining
an increased commitment from other countries to enforce American judgments and
in limiting many of the objections that foreign countries have to recognizing and
enforcing U.S. judgments.2' For other countries, whose judgments are already
enforced here in the absence of a treaty and without any requirement of reciprocity,
the primary interest in a convention is in establishing a narrower scope of
jurisdictional authority over their domiciliaries.' Whether or not the appropriate
compromises can be reached internationally and whether they will be acceptable
internally remain to be seen? Both for the United States and for most other countries,
ajudgments convention would be a symbol of closer cooperation and harmonization
in the field of law.
The present preliminary draft of the proposed Hague Convention24 attempts to
identify universally acceptable grounds for jurisdiction and possibly to mandate their
use. The bases for "general jurisdiction," that is, regardless of the claim being
asserted, would include habitual residence for individuals and place of incorporation,
statutory seat, principal place of business, and central administration for other
juridical entities.' Choice of forum clauses will confer exclusive jurisdiction (unless
otherwise provided);2 6 and appearance by the defendant other than for the purpose of
20. See, e.g, Volker Behr, Enforcement of United States Money Judgments in Germany, 13
J.L. & COM. 211 (1994); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments, in INTERNATIONAL LITGATIONANDTHE QUESTFOR REASONABLENESS 109,129-
36 (1996).
21. Other countries have consistently expressed concern over enforcement ofjudgments
with multiple or punitive damages as well as "excessive" damage awards, generally meaning
tort judgments rendered on the basis ofjury verdicts in the United States.
22. It is a common but incorrect assumption that judicial jurisdiction of United States
courts is more expansive than that of other countries. The United States and many European
countries have remarkably similar jurisdictional bases in many situations, and often the
jurisdictional reach of foreign courts is broader than that of United States courts, particularly
in multiparty cases where jurisdiction over one defendant establishes jurisdiction over other
defendants. See, e.g., Brussels Convention, supra note 17, art. 6(l)-(2), 1990 O.J. (C 189) at
4-5. However, United States courts' assertions of "general jurisdiction" on grounds of "tag"
and "doing business" are often viewed as excessive and exorbitant by other countries. These
perceptions of expansive jurisdiction and excesses of other aspects of American
procedure-broad discovery, trial byjury, contingent fees, and U.S. choice-of-law rules which
often tilt toward application of U.S. law-have led to resistance abroad to enforcing U.S.
judgments. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Linda J. Silberman, Judicial
Jurisdiction in the Conflict of-Laws Course: Adding a Comparative Dimension, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 395-96, 401-402 (1995).
23. For discussion ofthis question, see Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is OurNeed
for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away To Get It?, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167 (1998).
24. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Oct. 30, 1999, as
amended) (visited Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html>
[hereinafter Proposed Hague Convention].
25. See id. art. 3.
26. See id. art. 4.
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challenging jurisdiction is another required base of jurisdiction.27 There are also
special provisions for particular kinds of claims, that is, specific jurisdiction in
American parlance. For example, in tort cases, the appropriate forum under the
proposed Hague Convention is a court of the State where the tortious act or injury
takes place, subject to a foreseeability requirement.28 If the injured person does not
have a habitual residence in the place of injury, the court has jurisdiction only in
respect of injury occurring in that State.29 The proposed Hague Convention excludes
jurisdiction based on injury resulting from antitrust violations, 0 an exclusion resisted
by the U.S. negotiators.
As for contract actions, the specified forum is a court of the State where the goods
or services were provided or supplied."a A more specialized rule articulated for
contracts concluded by consumers authorizes suit at the habitual residence of the
consumer if the defendant has engaged in related activities in that State and the
consumer has taken steps necessary for conclusion of the contract in that State.32
Similarly, a special provision relating to individual contracts of employment permits
suit at the employee's habitual residence.33 A somewhat more embracing activity-
based jurisdiction contemplates jurisdiction in a court of a State where defendant
carries on regular commercial activity in respect of claims directly related to that
activity;34 that provision appears in brackets in the most recent draft and would
expand the present provision which confers jurisdiction on the basis of the existence
of a branch or other establishment of the defendant when the dispute relates directly
to that activity.3
Most of the jurisdictional provisions in the proposed Hague Convention would
seem to meet U.S. constitutional standards, 36 even though some of the bases are
expressed differently than many of the specific-act statutes in the United States.
However, several provisions, introduced in the latest Convention Draft, might be
inconsistent with U.S. constitutional norms. One provision authorizes jurisdiction
over multiple defendants when one defendant is habitually resident in the State and
other nonresident defendants are closely connected to the resident defendant and there
is a substantial connection between the State and the dispute involving the
nonresident defendant. Another authorizes jurisdiction over a third-party defendant
for indemnity or contribution when that court has jurisdiction over the original
defendant, the third-party action is permitted by national law, and there is a
substantial connection between the State and the dispute involving the third-party
27. See id. art. 5.
28. See id. art. 10(1).
29. See id. art. 10(4).
30. See id. art. 10(2).
31. See id. art. 6.
32. See id. art. 7.
33. See id. art. 8.
34. See id. art. 9.
35. See id.
36. See generally Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The
Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 125,
154-55 (1998); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 89, 116-18 (1999).
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defendant. Because the constitutional due process standard in the United States
stresses the relationship between the individual defendant and the forum-rather than
the relationship between the dispute and the forum alone 37-such provisions could
pose constitutional problems if they remain as required bases ofjurisdiction.
A second category ofjurisdictional bases is expressly prohibited as exorbitant. Not
only would Contracting States be required to deny recognition and enforcement to
judgments based on jurisdiction in this category, but also they would be prohibited
from directly asserting jurisdiction on any of the prohibited grounds. The proposed
Hague Convention identifies as prohibited jurisdiction any rule of jurisdiction
provided for under the national law of a Contracting State "if there is no substantial
connection between that State and the dispute."39 In particular, it identifies, as
exorbitant, jurisdiction based solely on: the presence of the defendant's property in
the forum State; nationality, domicile, habitual or temporary residence or presence
of the plaintiff; nationality, temporary residence or presence of the defendant as well
as service of the writ upon the defendant (that is, so-called "tag" jurisdiction);
unilateral designation of the forum by the plaintiff; the signing of a contract from
which the dispute arises; and the carrying on of commercial activities by the
defendant unless the dispute directly relates to those activities.4" An exception to the
exorbitant category for certain types of "human rights" claims is being
contemplated .
4
Unlike the Brussels/Lugano Convention under whichjurisdiction is either required
or prohibited, the proposed Hague Convention includes a third category of
jurisdiction, which is neither required nor prohibited; a Contracting State would be
permitted to exercise jurisdiction on such a basis, but other Contracting States would
not be under any obligation to recognize or enforce a judgment based on such
jurisdiction. This additional category was necessary because it was unlikely that given
the participation of a large number of States with different legal systems and cultures
there would be a consensus on what belonged in the areas of prohibited and required
jurisdiction. 42 This "middle" or "gray area" category ofjurisdiction appears as article
17 of the proposed Hague Convention, which states that the Convention does not
prevent the application by Contracting States of rules ofjurisdiction under national
law, provided that it is not one of the prohibited bases of jurisdiction.43 Until the
required and prohibited categories are completed, it is unclear just what will fall
37. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
38. Still, in limited contexts, treaty and legislative proxies could be relevant to the
constitutional calculus. See Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers"for International Shoe (And
None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 755, 762-67 (1995); Clermont, supra note 36, at 124-25.
39. Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 18(1).
40. See id. art. 18(2).
41. See id. art. 18(3).
42. The result is a so-called "mixed" convention. See generally Arthur T. von Mehren,
Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition Conventions, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17, 25-28 (1998).
43. Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 17.
2000]
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within this "gray list.""
From the United States's perspective, one particular aspect of the jurisdictional
provisions generating serious controversy is the treatment of general "doing business"
jurisdiction as an exorbitant and prohibited basis ofjurisdiction. Courts in the United
States have traditionally exercised jurisdiction when a defendant conducts systematic
and continuous activities within the forum state, even when the claim is unrelated to
the activity.4" Thus, when multinational enterprises have a permanent establishment
or other substantial activities in the United States, jurisdiction is easily obtainable in
the United States under existing law even with respect to a claim that arises outside
the United States.46 In many such cases, an action brought in the United States can
also be enforced in the United States when the defendant has assets here; thus there
is no need to obtain enforcement abroad. In order to join the Convention as it
presently stands, however, the United States would have to agree to abandon
jurisdiction against foreign defendants, whether or not enforcement abroad is
necessary.47 Efforts thus far by U.S. delegates to have "doing business" jurisdiction
moved from the prohibited list to the "gray list" have not succeeded, and it is possible
that the issue may be a deal-breaker at the Hague.
The proposed Hague Convention also addresses lispendens,48 that is, the possibility
of staying an action in deference to another previously commenced action, andforum
non conveniens.4 9 The provision for lis pendens applies to "proceedings based on the
same causes of action" and adopts in general a first-to-file (first-seised) rule.s" The
first-seised rule does not apply to actions requesting determinations ofnonliability; s'
44. For example, ifjurisdiction based on the defendant's carrying on of regular commercial
activity when the dispute relates to that activity, now in brackets in article 9, is not finally
included as a basis of required jurisdiction, it will probably not be prohibited, and accordingly
will be included in the gray area. Similarly, ifjurisdiction over a defendant based on status as
a co-defendant or third-party, as provided for in articles 14 and 16, presents constitutional
difficulties for countries like the United States, it may be shifted from a"required" basis to the
middle category of "permitted" jurisdiction. In addition, some areas of jurisdiction, such as
intellectual property issues, have not yet been addressed by the negotiators at the Hague.
45. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). See generally
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569,
577-86 (1958).
46. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1967). Of course,
where defendant's activities have been viewed as too thin, jurisdiction has been rejected as
inconsistent with due process. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 498 (1984); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, National Jurisdiction and the Multi-
National Enterprise, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATIONANDTHE QUESTFOR REASONABLENESS,
supra note 20, at 81-108.
47. Several commentators favorthe elimination ofthe "doing business"jurisdiction in this
context. See Clermont, supra note 36, at 114-15; Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L COMI. L.
I11, 119 (1999).
48. Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 2 1.
49. Id. art. 22.
50. Id. art. 21(1).
51. See id. art. 21(6)
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and a court second-seised may proceed if the plaintiff has failed to pursue the action
or if the court has not rendered a decision within a reasonable time. 2 The court first-
seised may itself decline to proceed if there is a more convenient forum elsewhere."3
A more general forum non conveniens provision appears in a separate article for use
in "exceptional circumstances."54
As for recognition and enforcement in the second State, all States party to the
Convention would be required to recognize and enforce judgments grounded on
jurisdiction on the mandated list; any judgment resting on a prohibited basis of
jurisdiction would be denied enforcement or recognition. As explained above,
judgments rendered on a basis ofjurisdiction in the "gray area" would not be required
to be recognized by other States; States would be free to recognize or not recognize
judgments based on jurisdiction in this category."
A federal statute implementing the Convention would set forth the jurisdictional
prerequisites for recognition and enforcement ofjudgments and, at minimum, identify
direct assertions ofjurisdiction prohibited by the Convention. The statute might also
impose the Convention's mandated category of territorial jurisdiction on whatever
court (state or federal) is appropriate to hear the action;56 alternatively, the statute
could authorize territorial jurisdiction in the federal courts when individual states do
not exercise the territorial reach required by the Convention. The federal statute
would probably not address direct assertions ofjurisdiction in the gray area, but it
could identify those bases of jurisdiction on the gray list that courts in the United
States would recognize, thereby creating a uniform domestic standard for recognition
and enforcement.5
7
III. THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Every statute, treaty, model law, or rule concerning recognition of foreign
judgments the world over provides an escape hatch termed public policy, or ordre
public or some comparable vague and undefined term, and this is true of the proposed
Hague Convention.s
52. See id. art. 21(3).
53. See id. art. 21(7).
54. Id. art. 22. See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Note on the
Question of "Forum Non Conveniens in the Perspective of a Double Convention on Judicial
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Decisions, Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 3 (Apr. 1996).
55. It is possible that the Convention could make a provision for declarations by States
when joining the Convention as to which bases ofjurisdiction in the gray area they will accept
as supporting ajudgment entitled to recognition and enforcement.
56. For a discussion of whether Congress has power to command the state courts to
exercise the territorial jurisdiction imposed under the Convention, see Clermont, supra note
36, at 128.
57. In the absence of a convention, a federal statute would address all aspects of
jurisdiction only indirectly, that is, in the context of the necessary jurisdictional prerequisites
for recognition and enforcement. Such a statute would thus offer a uniform national standard
for when ajudgment resting on the jurisdiction of a foreign court has an appropriate basis for
recognition and enforcement.
58. Article 28 ofthe proposed Hague Convention provides that recognition or enforcement
2000]
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In the United States, as in other federal states, it is often not clear whether public
policy is derived from the nation, or the subdivision in which the forum is located,
or from some brooding omnipresence that one knows even when he cannot see it.
Two recent cases-both arising from English libel judgments denied enforcement in
the United States-underscore the misunderstanding that sometimes accompanies
invocation of the public policy defense with respect to judgments. In both cases,
enforcement was refused because the defamation law of England was thought by the
American court to be less protective of First Amendment values of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press than required by the law in the United States as shaped by
New York Times v. Sullivan.59
In Telnikoffv. Matusevitch ° a libel judgment had been obtained by one resident of
England (Telnikoff) against another resident of England (Matusevich), both of whom
were Russian emigres.6' The alleged libel was contained in a letter written by
Matusevich, which accused Telnikoff of being a racist hatemonger.62 Later, the letter
was published in an English newspaper. As the dissenting judge emphasized, it is
hard to see how freedom of the press or any United States interest was implicated in
the case, because there was no American interest in the parties or the transaction. 6
Nevertheless the Maryland Court of Appeals, on certification from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, held that enforcing the judgment of the English court
would be "repugnant to Maryland public policy."'
In Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc. ,6 American public policy was
perhaps more to the point. The defendant was aNew York operator of a news service,
and the stories alleged to be libelous had been carried both in New York and in
England.' Thus a U.S. court might well be concerned about the opportunity of a
plaintiff in a libel action to circumvent constitutional protections granted to American
publications by choosing to sue the defendant in a foreign forum, and then seeking
to enforce a resulting judgment in the United States. Taking the two cases together,
it would seem that a correct understanding of a meaningful public policy defense
should identify the United States interests at stake and show how they are threatened,
rather than just applying forum public policy without differentiating between a cause
of action and the respect due to a judgment.67 We may be overly optimistic in
may be refused if it "would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State
addressed." Other defenses, particularly the express limitations on recognition for certain types
of damages in article 33, are more controversial.
59. 376 U.S. 967 (1964).
60. 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997), aff'd,159 F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
61. See id. at 235.
62. See id. at 233.
63. See id. at 257 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 249.
65. 585 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
66. See id. at 661.
67. Compare, in the United States interstate context, the famous case ofFauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U.S. 230 (1908), in which the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, required enforcement of a
Missouri judgment by the courts of Mississippi, although the underlying transaction on which




suggesting that embodying the public policy defense in a federal statute will lead to
acceptance of these insights, but it is our aim to try.
6
IV. THINKING ABOUT THE STATUTE
As mentioned previously, the proposed Hague Convention has two principal
aims-to establish rules on judicial jurisdiction, and to establish rules on recognition
and enforcement of'judgment. Other issues inevitably occur to one trying to think
through the problem of treatment in one State of litigation initiated in another.69
Meshing the different perspectives on these subjects in a convention designed to bring
together some forty countries (and more would be welcome) is a formidable
challenge.7" For a statute to be presented to the U.S. Congress, one may consider
some related questions, and hope that the U.S. delegation to the Hague Conference
acts to preserve the freedom of the parties to the proposed Hague Convention to adopt
legislation suitable to their respective needs and values. It would be premature for us
to offer answers to these questions now, and we expect to receive plenty of advice.
The following is just in the nature of an agenda, and does not purport to be complete.
A. Jurisdiction of Courts-Federal, State, or Both
Would federalizing enforcement and recognition of foreign countryjudgments also
call for federal courtjurisdiction for suits brought to enforce a foreign judgment? We
would think that at minimum federal jurisdiction concurrent with state court
jurisdiction should be provided, but one might also consider exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal courts. When a foreign country judgment is asserted as a defense to an
action brought in state court, removal to federal court could be expressly authorized,
following the model of the removal provision in chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, implementing the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.7' Again, this is not the only possible
solution.
68. An additional aspect of the public policy defense with respect to enforcement relates
once again to the federal/state issue. Because recognition and enforcement practice under
existing law has been a matter of state and not federal law, the policy invoked as a defense to
a foreign judgment is often state policy. If the proposed Hague Convention and/or a federal
statute makes enforcement a national issue, should public policy be understood as invoking
only national policy? And can there be national policy in those areas where substantive
regulatory policy is reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment, for instance with
respect to family law and succession? For more on the public policy exception in the context
ofthe proposed Hague Convention, see Joachim Zekoll, The Role andStatus ofAmerican Law
in the Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1283, 1300-07 (1998).
69. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues for the Hague Judgments
Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 157 (1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a
Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (1994).
70. For doubts about a worldwide convention of this type, see Friedrich K. Juenger, A
Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111 (1998).
71. See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1994).
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B. Definition of Terms
The proposed Hague Convention uses the term "habitual residence," rather than
domicile, as the principal basis ofjurisdiction over the defendant. The concept is not
well understood in the United States and might benefit from definition in the
implementing legislation. "Final judgment" may also turn out to be a term of art. As
to each of these terms the Convention may or may not contain a suitable definition.
The statute may undertake to restate or reformulate these terms in the American
idiom.
C. Res Judicata and Issue Preclusion
The general understanding in the United States has been that, as in the case of a
sister-state judgment, ajudgment of a foreign court has no greater effect in the United
States than in the country where the judgment was rendered. However, no rule
prevents a court in the United States from giving greater preclusive effect to a foreign
judgment than would be given in the foreign state,72 but expectations and incentives
to litigate in the initial forum must be considered. A federal statute might make some
provision with respect to the preclusive effects to be given to a foreign judgment.
D. Lis Pendens
Given the inclusion of a lis pendens provision in the proposed Hague Convention,
implementing legislation should provide guidance for courts in the United States as
to when they are authorized, and when required, to grant a stay in light of litigation
commenced in another Convention country, and what kind of security should be
available. One might also think about authorizing courts in the United States to
communicate with the relevant foreign court, at either court's initiative.
E. Procedure for Enforcement
It is likely that the proposed Hague Convention will do little more than direct
"expeditious and summary" procedures for enforcement. Federal implementing
legislation might make provision for summary enforcement in cases falling under the
convention, at least in federal courts and perhaps in state courts as well. A different
provision might be made applicable to cases not falling under the Convention.
Registration of foreign country judgments is probably premature, but it may be worth
thinking about, particularly with regard to judgments of close neighbors such as the
Canadian provinces.
F. Standards for Judicial Jurisdiction
A final issue in this preliminary menu is whether the jurisdiction to be exercised by
the courts in the United States, on the basis of stated contacts, should be understood
to refer to contacts with a particular state of the United States or to a national or
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 481 cmt. c & reporters' note 3 (1987).
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aggregate standard ofjurisdiction. It would certainly be possible to make the exercise
of jurisdiction over foreign defendants dependent upon the foreign defendant's
contacts with the United States as a whole and not just a particular state, but one
needs to think further about whether this would be desirable.'
CONCLUSION
We think that preparing a draft statute and commentary concerning recognition and
enforcement of foreign country judgments is an exciting project, worthy of the State
Department, of the Congress-and of the American Law Institute. The project is not,
of course, an alternative-or even a supplement-to a new restatement. But our
project should be provocative in several ways to those thinking about a third
restatement of conflicts and its possible content. First, it reminds that the principles
of conflicts do not operate only within the boundaries of the United States and that
private international law has a role to play in thinking about choice of law,
jurisdiction, and the enforcement of judgments. Second, the Judgments Project
illustrates that there are alternative models to restatements for developing and
changing law, as the American Law Institute has recognized on other occasions.
Thus, a possible "Conflicts Project" might set forth and explore various choice of law
methods and explain how each of those methods is appropriately invoked. Options
(possibly even with favored recommendations) might be set forth for adoption by
courts.
For the present, however, we hope to enlist interested parties in our project-an
immediate task of manageable proportion. It can usefully engage the energies of the
law professors, practitioners, judges, and government officials who constitute the
membership of the American Law Institute, and at the end come out with a needed
improvement to the legal environment of the United States, and to its relations with
its treaty partners.
73. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987).
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